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Abstract 
The issue of allocation of seats in the European Parliament among the Member States of the EU has been the subject of 
several studies and proposals of algorithms of allocation. The rejection by the Parliament of the Cambridge Compromise 
means that the issue is still pertinent. This article presents a new method of forming the composition of the EP based on the 
well-known algorithms of Pukelsheim and Ramirez, called the shifted root. The composition of the Parliament obtained with 
the use of this method is also given, followed by a discussion of the results. 
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1. Introduction 
The division of seats in the European Parliament among the EU Member States still remains an unresolved 
problem. The significant increase in the importance of the EP witnessed in recent years, in particular following 
the strengthening of its role by the Lisbon Treaty, has resulted in the growing interest of the Member States in the 
numbers of their representation in this organ of UE. With regard to the seats allocation the Treaty states that:  
The European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed 
seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively 
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proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated 
more than ninety-six seats. 
The motivation of the Committee on the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report dated Oct 3, presented six 
principles which, according to the Committee, could introduce more precision into the rule of degressive 
proportionality. Two of these constitute the essence of this method: 
The principle of fair distribution – no State will have more seats than a larger Member State or smaller 
amount of seats than a smaller Member State. 
The principle of relative proportionality – the ratio of the population size to the number of seats is greater the 
larger the State, and smaller the smaller the State. 
Hence degressive proportionality is based on two conditions. The first is completely natural and states that the 
larger the country, the greater is its right to a large number of seats. The second condition, which is the essence of 
degressive proportionality, declares that the MEP of a larger country represents a greater number of the 
population than an MEP of a smaller country. This implies that the population/seats ratio has to grow in line with 
the growth of the populations of  the member states. Despite the fact that the numerical limitations contained in 
the Treaty are of an unequal nature, several recommendations of the AFCO and resolutions of the EP stress that 
the given numerical values should be applied in order to achieve the maximum diversification of the allocation of 
the seats. The greatest possible diversification of the numbers of seats apportioned to individual states is also 
considered as relevant. The problem of diversification was analyzed in the paper (Dniestrzański, 2011a). 
Therefore, the majority of proposals regarding the problem of the seats allocation assumes that the smallest 
country obtains 6 seats in the EP, and the biggest 96 seats, while the whole Parliament numbers 751 MEPs. These 
limitations are as follows: 
B1. minimum number of seats allocated to a state is 6, 
B2. maximum number of seats allocated to a state is 96, 
B3. the total number of seats in the EP amounts to 751. 
Further on in this article the limitations B1 – B3 will be referred to as the boundary conditions of the 
degressively proportional division. The influence of the boundary conditions on the possibilities of the seats 
allocation was the subject of a broader analysis in (Łyko, 2012). 
Since the beginnings of the EP, the allocation of seats among the Member States has not been proportional. A 
more detailed analysis of its composition during subsequent terms of office shows that, in particular after 
accession by the new members, even though it was not required by any legal act, the allocation of the seats 
during several of the terms followed the principle of degressive proportionality, i.e. the growing population/ seats  
ratio, alongside the growing number of populations of the member states. It seems that this principle intuitively 
constituted a natural alternative in a situation where there was no possibility of applying a proportional division. 
The first exception, before the legal sanctioning of the degressive proportionality by the Lisbon Treaty, was the 
composition of the EP in 1995, following the accession by Austria, Finland and Sweden. At that time 
incompatibility occurred with the principle of degressive proportionality – the representation of Sweden was too 
small compared to the larger Portugal. The population/ seats ratio amounted to 400 745 for Sweden, and was 
higher than the corresponding coefficient 400 703 for Portugal. One of the reasons behind the problems with 
applying degressive proportionality has been undoubtedly the fast expansion of the EU. In 1994 there were 12 
Member States, and nowadays there are28. With such a large number of Member States, an allocation of seats 
which has to follow certain limitations is not simple without the construction of a precise algorithm. Over the last 
ten years, representatives of science and politics have proposed several possible solutions of this issue. Some 
precise studies appeared in publications even before the signing of the Treaty on Dec 13, 2007, as a reaction to 
the earlier discussions on this subject. With hindsight, two of those proposals still seem to be significant, and are 
considered as a possibility of a decisive solution in this matter. They are the parabolic method of Ramirez and the 
method of shifted proportionality of Pukelsheim. A profound analysis of the mathematical properties of the 
function, which can be useful for this problem, can be found in the paper (Słomczyński & Życzkowski, 2011). 
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2. Parabolic method of Ramirez 
Victoriano Ramírez-González (2007) suggested the use of a square function for the seats allocation, and called 
it the Ramirez parabolic method. He proved that for the 2007 population and the 27 member states, all parabolas 
290( ) 6 ( )f x x m cx
M m
    , for > @0.00143257,0.0015003c , (1) 
give the same allotment. The seat distribution with the use of the parabolic method is shown in column F in 
Table 1. The table highlights the state for which the quotient of the population number and the number of seats is 
higher than for a state that is bigger, which is contrary to the idea of degressive proportionality. The parabolic 
method is compatible only on the level of quotas, i.e. the number of seats  before rounding up/down. The problem 
of rounding is much wider and goes beyond the considerations of Ramirez. The EP Resolution of March 13, 2013 
on the composition of the Parliament in view of the 2014 elections (2012/2309 (INI)) means that this subtle delict 
of the parabolic, and many other methods ceases to be relevant. Compatibility at the level of quotas is an obvious 
result of the concavity of the function used for the division. In the paper (Dniestrzański, 2011a), it was shown 
that concavity is not a necessary condition for degressive proportionality. However, with the assumption that we 
have a non-receding function, it is a sufficient condition. 
Ramirez assumed that in the EP there are 750 members which was a result of legislative ambiguity regarding 
this issue. The Treaty of Lisbon states that the number of parliamentarians not exceed seven hundred and fifty in 
number, plus the President, therefore it was not obvious how to approach this issue. 
The Ramirez construct constitutes a valid element of the work on the allocation of seats in the European 
Parliament. Although the author does not explain the reason for choosing a square function as a tool serving this 
purpose, such a choice can be easily justified. The essence of degressive proportionality is an increase in the ratio 
of the number of population to the number of seats alongside the population increase. Therefore, one of the 
fundamental matters is the question of how fast should that increase be. No legal act declares this in a precise 
way. Hence a reasonable assumption is that such growth should be steady, i.e. have constant acceleration. The 
only class of functions meeting the condition of constant and non-zero acceleration are square functions. 
Therefore, one could venture a statement that the parabolic method is the most degressive method. However, 
from the viewpoint of simplicity and clarity that method looks less attractive. 
3. Shifted proportionality by Pukelsheim 
A different approach to this issue was suggested by Pukelsheim (2010). He provided a very simple and natural 
construction, which he called the shifted proportionality. Very briefly, the idea of the shifted proportionality is 
as follows: 
 
Each state obtains six seats and the remainder is allocated proportionally. 
 
The Pukelsheim construct was presented at a time when the EU consisted of 27 states, therefore after fulfilling 
the assumption that each Member State obtains at the start 6 seats, it all comes down to a proportional division of 
the remaining 589 seats, respecting the requirement that the largest state has to have 96 seats. Pukelsheim 
suggested using for the allocation of the remaining seats the divisor method of Webster, i.e. rounding the 
obtained values to the nearest integer. The seats allocation proposed as a result of applying the method of shifted 
proportionality is shown in column C in Table 1. The population figure in 2007 was used as the basis for 
allocation. The method of shifted proportionality is unable to resist the problem of rounding. As a result of 
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rounding the obtained values (quotas) for individual states to the nearest integers, in as many as five cases there 
occurs incompatibility with the principle of degressive proportionality. 
 
Table 1. Composition of the EP using the shifted proportionality of Pukelsheim and the parabolic method of Ramirez for 2007 population. 
A B C D E F G H 
Mem. State Population 2007 Pukelsheim Ramirez 
 Seats Pop/seats (In) In/ In-1 Seats Pop/seats (In) In/ In-1 
Germany 82438000 96 858729   96 858729  
France 62886200 83 759027 0,8839 79 797458 0,9286 
UK 60421900 80 754924 0,9946 76 794657 0,9965 
Italy 58751700 77 763022 1,0107 75 783369 0,9858 
Spain 43758300 59 741666 0,9720 59 741666 0,9468 
Poland 38157100 52 733790 0,9894 53 719945 0,9707 
Romania 21610200 32 675319 0,9203 34 635594 0,8828 
Netherlands 16334200 26 628238 0,9303 27 604970 0,9518 
Greece 11125200 20 556260 0,8854 20 556260 0,9195 
Portugal 10569600 19 556347 1,0002 20 528530 0,9501 
Belgium 10511400 19 553232 0,9944 20 525570 0,9944 
Czech Rep 10251100 18 569506 1,0294 19 539532 1,0266 
Hungary 10076600 18 559867 0,9831 19 530400 0,9831 
Sweden 9047800 17 532282 0,9507 18 502711 0,9478 
Austria 8265900 16 516681 0,9707 17 486288 0,9673 
Bulgaria 7718,800 15 514653 0,9961 16 482488 0,9922 
Denmark 5427500 13 417500 0,8112 13 417500 0,8653 
Slovak Rep. 5389200 13 414554 0,9929 13 414554 0,9929 
Finland 5255600 12 438050 1,0567 13 404354 0,9754 
Ireland 4209000 11 382636 0,8735 11 382636 0,9463 
Lithuania 3403,300 10 340330 0,8894 10 340330 0,8894 
Latvia 2294600 9 255067 0,7495 9 255067 0,7495 
Slovenia 2003400 8 250425 0,9818 8 250425 0,9818 
Estonia 1344,700 8 168213 0,6717 7 192243 0,7677 
Cyprus 766400 7 109486 0,6509 6 127733 0,6644 
Luxembourg 459500 7 67071,4 0,6126 6 78250 0,6126 
Malta 404300 6 67550 1,0071 6 67550 0,8633 
Total 492881500 751 65642,5  750 65730  
Source: Own calculations on the basis of (Pukelsheim, 2010) and (Ramirez, 2007). 
 
In Table 1 there are highlighted states for which the quotient of the number of population and number of seats 
is higher than for a larger state. The conducted simulations show that the obtained allocation can be “repaired” in 
several ways by changing the number of seats by, at the most, one. One such possibility would be taking away 
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one seat each from France, Great Britain, Greece, Denmark, Romania, Slovakia and Luxembourg and 
incrementing them for Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria and Slovenia. The 
obtained allocation would then be closer to the idea of shifted proportionality, but it will not be its pure form. 
The seat distribution with the use of shifted proportionality was also discussed in the paper (Cegiełka et al., 
2010). The authors presented there a hypothetical composition of the EP using that method, and rounding the 
quotas with the methods of Webster, Adams and D’Hondt. 
Pukelsheim’s shifted proportionality  became the basis of the most serious proposal of solving the problem of 
seats allocation, the so-called Cambridge Compromise (Grimmett et al., 2011). It was presented as a result of a 
symposium of mathematicians which took place in the Centre of Mathematical Science at the University of 
Cambridge on Jan 28 – 29, 2011. One of the differences in regard to the Pukelsheim method was the assumption 
that each Member State will receive at the start 5 seats, which was called base, and the remaining number will be 
divided proportionally, rounding up the obtained values to the nearest integer. Additionally, there were details 
prepared in such a way which allow the long-term use of the accepted solution. For example, the way of 
establishing a future base number of seats was given depending on the number of the member states. The 
presented document contained the proposal of seat distribution the EP’s eighth term of office. The algorithm of 
division contained in the report of the symposium was called the base+prop method. Analysis of the content of 
the Cambridge Compromise can be found in the articles (Dniestrzański, 2011b) and (Grimmett, 2012). 
Although the Cambridge Compromise seems to be a rational way which could solve the long-term problems 
with setting an algorithm for forming the composition of the European Parliament, it was nevertheless rejected as 
a way to form such representation. The seat distribution in the eighth term of office was presented in the 
Resolution of the EP dated March 13, 2013, regarding the composition of the EP with a view to the 2014 
elections (2012/2309(INI)). The main factor which prompted the Parliament to accept a solution different than 
the Cambridge Compromise was a reluctance to grant too great a change in the number of seats in possession of 
individual Member States in relation to the number of MEPs in the 2009 – 2014 term of office. The point of 
departure for the division of seates for 2014 – 2019 was the assumption that no member of the Union should lose 
nor gain more than one seat in the next term of office. Subsequently, by applying a delicate correction of the 
apportioned mandates, the final version of the allocation was obtained. At the same time, the above-mentioned 
resolution follows the proposals suggested by the authors in the Cambridge Compromise in one vital element. 
Article 1 of the resolution reads: 
In the application of the principle of degressive proportionality provided for in the first subparagraph of 
Article 14(2) TEU, the following principles shall apply: 
x the allocation of seats in the European Parliament shall fully utilise the minimum and maximum numbers set 
by the Treaty in order to reflect as closely as possible the sizes of the respective populations of Member 
States; 
x the ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State before rounding to whole 
numbers shall vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each Member of the 
European Parliament from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a 
less populous Member State and, conversely, that the larger the population of a Member State, the greater its 
entitlement to a large number of seats. 
Acceptance of the EP regarding the proposed correction of the resolution dated Oct 11, 2007, will decidedly 
ease the task of setting the rules of forming the composition of the European Parliament in future. 
4.  New proposal – shifted root 
The method of shifted proportionality and the parabolic method are frequently indicated in the official 
documents of the EP as the point of reference for the construction of the allocation of mandates in future terms of 
office of the Parliament. Therefore, it may be assumed that they are closest to the idea of degressive 
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proportionality. We will propose now an algorithm of the division of mandates which is to a certain degree an 
intermediary solution. Using the terminology created by Pukelsheim, it will be referred to as shifted root.  
Table 2. Composition of the EP using the shifted root, parabolic method and base+prop for 2012 population. 
A B C D E F G 
Member State Population 2012 g1 g2 Parabolic Base+prop 2014 - 2019 
Germany 81843743 96 96 96 96 96 
France 65397912 79 79 80 83 74 
United Kingdom 62989550 77 77 78 80 73 
Italy 60820764 74 74 75 78 73 
Spain 46196276 59 59 60 61 54 
Poland 38538447 51 50 51 51 51 
Romania 21355849 32 31 32 31 32 
Netherlands 16730348 26 26 26 25 26 
Greece 11290935 20 20 20 19 21 
Belgium 11041266 20 20 19 18 21 
Portugal 10541840 19 19 19 18 21 
Czech Republic 10505445 19 19 19 18 21 
Hungary 9957731 18 18 18 17 21 
Sweden 9482855 18 18 17 17 19 
Austria 8443018 16 16 16 16 19 
Bulgaria 7327224 15 15 15 15 17 
Denmark 5580516 13 13 13 12 13 
Slovakia 5404322 13 13 12 12 13 
Finland 5401267 13 13 12 12 13 
Ireland 4582769 12 12 11 11 11 
Croatia 4398150 11 11 11 11 11 
Lithuania 3007758 9 10 9 9 11 
Slovenia 2055496 8 8 8 8 8 
Latvia 2041763 8 8 8 8 8 
Estonia 1339662 7 7 7 7 6 
Cyprus 862011 6 7 7 6 6 
Luxembourg 524853 6 6 6 6 6 
Malta 416110 6 6 6 6 6 
Total  751 751 751 751 751 
Source: Own calculations. 
Function ( ) af x cx  ( > @0,1a , 0c ! ) fulfills all the conditions to be an allocation function for the seat 
distribution as a realization of the principle of degressive proportionality. It is a growing and concave function, 
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and value of the coefficient a  is in a certain sense a measure of degression of the division obtained with its use. 
For 0a   we have an equal division, and for 1a  we obtain proportional division. However it cannot become 
directly the basis  of the construct of division because of the boundary conditions. The simulations conducted for 
populations of Member States show that the function is not able to meet all the boundary conditions. For 
example, taking as a function of allocation 1/2( ) 0,01066f x x  (for the populations of the Member States as of 
Jan 1, 2012), and rounding down the obtained values to the nearest integer, we can obtain a Parliament with 1039 
members. Although the obtained allocation meets the remaining boundary conditions (the smallest member state 
– Malta – has 6 seats, and the largest – Germany – 96 seats), yet such an allocation remains too distant from the 
declarations of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the size of the entire EP. 
The proposal called shifted root is based on awarding all the Member States a certain equal number of seats 
(following the Cambridge Compromise we shall call it base and mark it b ), and apportioning all the remaining 
mandates using function ( ) af x cx . Therefore the idea of the proposed algorithm is to construct a division using 
as a function of allocation function ( ) ag x b cx  , where b  is a natural number. The conducted analysis show 
that this method allows to construct a seat allocation for the 2014 – 2019 term of office in accordance with the 
boundary conditions. Table 2 shows an example of allocation based on the shifted root. 
The division shown in column C is based on the function of allocation given in the formula 
0,93
1( ) 5 0,000003963g x x   . The quotas obtained using function 1g  were rounded to the nearest integer. The 
division in column D is based on the function of allocation 0,912 ( ) 5 0,000005719g x x    and rounding up to the 
nearest integer. To compare the obtained results, Table 2 also shows the distribution of seas which was obtained 
using the parabolic method and the base+prop method for the population in 2012. Table 2 is complemented by 
the composition of the EP in the eighth term of office contained in the resolution of EP dated March 13, 2013. 
The results obtained with the method of shifted root are close to those obtained by the parabolic method. The 
numbers of seats in the columns C and D in Table 2 differ from those obtained with the parabolic method by not 
more than one.  Greater differences can be found in relation to the method of shifted proportionality but they do 
not exceed 4 seats. Although the parabolic method assumes as the basis of division a square function we can, in a 
broader sense, think that the proposed algorithm is an intermediary solution between the shifted proportionality 
and the parabolic method – square function is a particular example of function ( ) ag x b cx  . For the value  0,1a  it is ' 1( ) ag x cax   and 'lim ( ) 0
x
g xof   hence the tempo of increase in value ( )g x  decreases asymptotically to zero. This seems to be consistent with the idea of degressive proportionality. Similar methods 
were discussed in (Łyko, 2012b) and (Słomczyński & Życzkowski, 2011). 
 Conclusions 
Fixing the precise rules of forming the composition of the European Parliament may ease or even eliminate 
tedious political negotiations before every election. Following the rejection of the Cambridge Compromise, the 
basis of the seat allocation is only the Treaty of Lisbon and the occasional resolutions of the EP. The issue of 
quantitative representation of the Member States still remains unresolved. 
The proposed method is in a certain sense an intermediary solution between the shifted proportionality of 
Pukelsheim and the parabolic method of Ramirez. The results and the analysis presented here are a mere 
introduction to further research verifying its usefulness. To obtain a fuller picture, we should assess how 
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